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1)
MEMORANDUM

To:
Laura Levins
From: Applicant
Date: February 27, 2607
Re:
Tamara Shea
In response to your memorandum dated February 27,2007,l submft to you this memorandum
regarding whether or not our client Tamara Shea may maintain a cause of action against either
Ann Remlck or Dan Andemon as a result of her failure to receive a oommission for the sale of
Refnick's property to Anderson. For the reasons that follow, I belleve that we will not be able to
mainatain an action against Remick for breach of contract. However, we may establish a cause
of action against Anderson for interference with prospective economic advantage, but likely will
not be able to establish a cause of action against Anderson for interferencewith contractual
relations.
I. Can Shea Malntaln a Breach of Contract Clalm Agalnst Remick?
The slmple anewer to thle queatlon is that Shea will not likely be able to maintain a breach of
contract action against Remlck. The reason she would not be able to do so is that her listing
agreement had expired, and thus any implied contract that our client thought she may have had
to continue listing the property for sale after would not be enforceable under the Statute of
Frauds.
According to the information obtalned from our client In your Interview with her yesterday,
February 26, 2007, she had a written listing agreement in place with Remick to sell a 20-aCre
undeveloped property in Briefwood Township, Cleveland County. The listing agreement was
slgned in early November, allowing our client to advertise, list, and present the property to
potential buyers in an attempt to sell the property for Renick. Further, the agreement provided
that our client would receive "a brokerage commission of 10 percent of the agreed-upon sale
price if, prior to the expriation of this Agreement, Broker procures a buyer..." The agreement
was for a period of 60 days, and expired on January 8,2007.
Our client was unable to deliver a buyer prlor to the expiratton of the agreement. Then, on
January 10,2007, after receiving a phone call from Mr. Dan Anderson expressing interest in the
property, our client attempted to contact Renick in order to extend the agreement. She was
unable to diractly speak to her, but received a voicemail from Remick stating that she was out
of town due to a family emergency and was not sure how long she would be gone, and also told
our client that she would extend the listing agreement as soon as she returned and that our
client should continue showing the property in the meantime. As a result, our client sent a
confirmation letter to Renick for her signature, but it was n e w returned to her with Renick's
signature affixed.

A. The Oral Extenston of the Lbtlng Agresment is Llkely Unem-ble
Fallurn to Comply with the Statute of Frauds

Due to

5 1500 of the Franklin CMI Code, which lists what agreements are required to be In writing,
provides in pertinent part:

-

-

4

k-

mar-2-27-07-AM-MPTl

NMBar

The following agreements are unenforceable, unless they, or some note or

~~~~ thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged:
mmissiin:

(d) An agreement that authokes or employs a broker, for compensation or
1. To procure a purchaser or seller of real estate

The purpose of this statute is to protect real estate sellers and purchasers from false Claims by
brokers for commissions, and because It is designed to protect consumers, it is stn'ctb
enforced. Mather v. Brown (Franklin Ct. App. 1997). For a writing to satisfy the statute of
frauds, the principle requirements are: (1) the writing shows the authority of the broker to act for
the party to be charged, and (2) the writing is subscribed (signed) by or on behalf of the party to
be charged. Id. The original listing agreement between our client and Renick clearly Satisfies
each of these required elements. However, the oral extension of the agreement Is our mein
concern here, and it does not appear to meet each element as required to be enforceable.

In Mather, the court was confronted wllh a similar issue as the one faced here. In that case, a
broker obtained a lease offer from a prospective lessee, only to have It rajectod by the lessor
that the broker had an agreement with. However, two weeks later, the broker discovered that
the prospective lessee that she originally obtained had subsequently signed a lease agreement
directly with the lessor, the result leaving the broker without a commission. According to the
court, because there was a written and clearly valid brokerage agreement In place, the broker
properly alleged a cause of action for breach of contract and allowed the broker to pureue her
case to trial.

The Mather case Is distinguishable on its facts from our client's predicament. Hem, our client
did not have an enforceable extension to the listing agreement that would comply with the
Statute of Frauds. Our client's situation Is more like the one the court faced in Phlllip v. Carter
Industries (cited in Mather), where the court rejected the brokets attempt to show that a valid
and enforceable brokerage agreement existed because the only writings offered were from the
broker to the client, and not from the client to the broker. Here, because the letter sent to
Renick was from our client, and was not signed, it is likely that the court will reject any attempt
to assert a breach of contract claim against Renlck because the listing agreement had expired,
and the extension failed to comply with the Statute of Frauds.
II. Can Shea Malntaln a Clalm for Interference Wlth Contractual Relations Agalnst
Anderson?

Because the extension to the llstlng agreement Is likely not errforceable, it Is doubtful that our
dient can maintain an interference with contractual relations claim against Anderson.
Tort liability for interefmoe wtth contractual mlatlons requlm an exlstfng valld and
enforceable contract. Mather (emphasis in original). To state a proper cause of action and
prevail for interference with contractual relations, a plalntlff must plead and prove: (1) a valld
and enforceable amtract between the plainti and a third party, (2) the defendant's knowledge
of the existence of the contractual relationship, (3) intentional and improper acts on the part of a
defendant designed to disrupt the relationship, (4) actual disruption of the relationship, and (5)
economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the Defendant's acts.
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From the facts ascertained from our dient at your meeting with her yesterday, them is reason to
believe that we could offer facts that would meet elements 2-5 of a claim for interfermU3 with
contractual relations. Of course, as discussed above, we may not be able to meet the threshdd
of proving a valid and enforceable contract. For reasons that will Ix discussed below in the
conclusion, It may be prudent for us to plead attemative theodes of recovery against A n d e m ,
should we be able to prove a valid and enforceable contract with Rernick.
IIf. Can Shea Malntaln a C a w ofActlon tor Intsrfemnce wtth Prospectiwe Emnomk
Advantage Agalnst Andemon?

Unlike the previous two questlone asked, the answer to this question Is a likely yes. Unlike the
breach of contract claim and interference wtth contractual relations daim, this tort is not
dependent on compliance wlth the Statute of Frauds. Mather. Thus, even if we are unable to
establish a valid and enforceable contract, our client would still be able to proceed based on this
cause of actlon.
To e8tabllah and prsvall on a clalm for Interference wlth propsecthre economic advantage, we
must plead and prove, an economic relationship betweetn the plaintiff and a third party
containing the probability of future economic benefi to the plaintiff, (2) defendant's k n d e d g e
of the existence, of the relatlonship, (3) intentional and improper acts on the part of the
defendant designed to disrupt the relatlonship, (4) actual disruption of the relationship, and (5)
economic harm to the plaintiff proximately caused by the defendant's acts.

,

Thls I8 an intentional tort that can only be established If Anderson had knowledge of the
relationshlp between our client and Remlck. See Downey & Co. v. Sierra Growers (Franklin Ct.
App. 2000). Given that we can proffer evidence of an offer to purchase Remick's property
signed on January 13, 2007, 1 believe that we can clearly establish that Anderson had full
knowledge of the relatlonshlp between our client. The question then becomes if we can
establish to the trier of fact's satisfaction that Anderson commited intentional and improper acts
designed to disrupt the relatlonship between our client and Remick. According to our client,
Remick admitted to her that Anderson made statements regarding the inabilrty to tmst realton,
amongst other things, In conjunction with inducing her to deal with him directly in order to Save
the commission. (Of course, there may be hearsay concerns in getting testimony of this nature
admitted at trial, but that is beyond the scope of this memorandum). And, there is little doubt
we could establish the other elements to the court's satisfaction, that there was an actual
disruption and economic harm.

CONCLUSION
It Is unlikely that a breach of contract action against Remick would succeed due to the failure of
the extension of the listing agreement to comply with the Statute of Frauds. In addition,
because we would likely not be able to establish a valid and enforceable contract, we would not
be able to maintein a claim for interference with contractual relations against Anderson.
However, because there is no need to show a valid and enforceable contract, our client would
likely be able to maintein an action for interference with prospective economic advantage
against Anderson. For reasons of prudence, if we were to file en action against Anderson, it
would be best to plead both theories in the alternative in case other e v i d e n ~
comes to ligM that
would establish a valid and enforceable contract between Renick. This type of alternative
pleading was implicitly recognized as proper in Mather.
If you have any questions, please k t me know.
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